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Hroub-2006, -- First line of the preamble: "Compelled by our conviction that we are defending one of the greatest ports of Islam ..." (p.8) -- Section "Our principles": - those principles stem "from the Islamic tradition that we embrace" (p.9) - "True Islam ... is our frame of reference and our way of life." (p.9) -- In the "final appeal": "When you cast your ballot, remember your responsibility before God. ... Yes, make the right choice, that you may please God and your people, God willing. Islam is the solution, and it is our path for change and reform" (p.13) -- "Six other articles have at least one reference to Islam." [He lists all of them, p. 13 f.] objects the fall 2005 "Electoral Platform for Change and Reform" constitutes "without a doubt the broadest vision that Hamas has ever presented concerning all aspects of Palestinian life" (p.9). All the docu- ment's 17 articles refer to several aspects of state building. The "overriding thrust of the document is the domestic scene, with particular emphasis on governance and reform" (p.10). [He lists exten- sive details to civil rights and liberties, pluralism and demo- cratic values]. Indeed, "it could be said that the document was designed to carry out exactly the kinds of reform that had been demanded by Western governments and financial institutions" (p.11)., -- the preamble refers to the "liberation of Palestine" and "supporting the resistance and the intifada program" (p.8). -- A separate section "Our principles" emphasizes: - "ownership" of Historic Palestine "by the Palestinian people is a right that does not diminish over time." - "Our Palestinian people are still living a phase of national liberation, and thus they have the right to strive to recover their own rights and end the occupation using all means, including armed struggle." -- a passage at the end: "The al-Aqsa intifada has created new realities on the ground. It has made the Oslo program a thing of the past." (8) objects the fall 2005 "Electoral Platform for Change and Reform" constitutes "without a doubt the broadest vision that Hamas has ever presented concerning all aspects of Palestinian life" (p.9). All the docu- ment's 17 articles refer to several aspects of state building. The "overriding thrust of the document is the domestic scene, with particular emphasis on governance and reform" (p.10). [He lists exten- sive details to civil rights and liberties, pluralism and demo- cratic values]. Indeed, "it could be said that the document was designed to carry out exactly the kinds of reform that had been demanded by Western governments and financial institutions" (p.11)., these are "the only places in the entire document that refer to resistance." Surprising "is the virtual absence of military resistance from the platform: there is simply no comparison between the weight and detail given to civilian aspects of governance promised by Hamas and the weight accorded to resistance." "Interestingly, in the single reference to 'armed struggle' ..., the emphasis is on the right to end the occupation 'using all means, including armed struggle.' The other two references are not only very general, but are actually, as noted above, used to justify Hamas’s participation in the elections." (p.10) objects -- the preamble refers to the "liberation of Palestine" and "supporting the resistance and the intifada program" (p.8). -- A separate section "Our principles" emphasizes: - "ownership" of Historic Palestine "by the Palestinian people is a right that does not diminish over time." - "Our Palestinian people are still living a phase of national liberation, and thus they have the right to strive to recover their own rights and end the occupation using all means, including armed struggle." -- a passage at the end: "The al-Aqsa intifada has created new realities on the ground. It has made the Oslo program a thing of the past." (8), Recent Hamas documents show a new emphasis on state building, "little inclination to radical posi- tions," and downplaying of religious "over- tones" (p. 25) this is interesting because "these remarkable documents, so revealing of Hamas’s evolving thought and em- phases, have received practically no coverage in the Western media or official circles. ... Instead, Hamas continues to be characterized with reference to its 1988 charter, drawn up less than a year after the movement was established in direct response to the outbreak of the first intifada and when its raison d’ˆetre was armed resistance to the occupation." (p.7), the fall 2005 "Electoral Platform for Change and Reform" constitutes "without a doubt the broadest vision that Hamas has ever presented concerning all aspects of Palestinian life" (p.9). All the docu- ment's 17 articles refer to several aspects of state building. The "overriding thrust of the document is the domestic scene, with particular emphasis on governance and reform" (p.10). [He lists exten- sive details to civil rights and liberties, pluralism and demo- cratic values]. Indeed, "it could be said that the document was designed to carry out exactly the kinds of reform that had been demanded by Western governments and financial institutions" (p.11). supports Recent Hamas documents show a new emphasis on state building, "little inclination to radical posi- tions," and downplaying of religious "over- tones" (p. 25), the "cabinet platform delivered by Prime Minister–elect Ismail Haniyeh on 27 March 2006 in a speech before the newly elected parliament. What makes the platform especially interesting is that it represents Hamas alone, having been drafted after the collapse of the national unity negotiations when there was no longer any need to make concessions to the factions" (p.19) -- seeks "to address diverse audiences and to convey various messages, not always easy to reconcile. It sought to reassure the wider Palestinian public that their interests were the supreme preoccupation of the government and to convey to Fatah and the other electoral losers its desire to work together. It sought to signal to Israel its nonbelligerency and expectation of smooth interaction in 'necessary contacts in all mundane affairs,' even while emphasizing Palestinian suffering from Israeli policies and the Palestinians’ legitimate right to resist the occupation. It sought to overcome or temper the alarm in the West caused by its victory, emphasizing its commitment to responsible governance and to agendas long promoted by the international community. It sought to portray itself to the neighboring skeptical Arab regimes, which feared the ramifications of a Hamas victory on their domestic affairs, as a responsible, trustworthy, and moderate government. At the same time, it had to live up to its promises and the expectations of its own constituency, and to reassure other Islamist move- ments and exponents of political Islam in the Middle East and beyond that the Hamas in power would be the same as the Hamas they had always known." (p.19 f.) -- Haniyeh emphasizes: "'We are committed to settling our differences in political positions and policies through dialogue, cooperation, and continuous coordina- tion between the presidency and the other national institutions" (p.20) -- "Despite the refusal to formally recognize the PLO-Israel agreements or international resolutions on Palestine, the concept of the two-state solution is everywhere between the lines in Haniyeh’s speech, including in his insistence 'on the Palestinian geographical unity and the need to link the two halves (West Bank and Gaza) of the homeland politically, economically, socially, and cultur- ally. Parallel to this, we also emphasize the importance of linking the Palestinian people at home and in the diaspora.' The reference to the West Bank and Gaza as the 'two halves,' with no reference to the 'rest of the homeland' in between (i.e., Israel proper) is highly significant" (p. 22) -- "As in the case of the electoral platform and the national unity program already discussed, there is not the slightest hint of an intention to destroy Israel. Indeed, the speech could be said to represent an advance over the other two in this regard in that there is no reference to either 'armed struggle' (as in the preamble of the electoral platform) or 'the current phase' (as in article 5 of the national unity platform)." (p.22) -- "the core of Haniyeh’s speech was his government’s program" (p. 23, examples) -- "emphasizing good governance, matters of social justice, various aspects of economic and administrative reform, the rule of law, and the judiciary" (p. 23) -- additionally, "the notion of citizenship was developed. ... 'The government also undertakes to protect the rights of every citizen and to firmly establish the principle of citizenship without any discrimination on the basis of creed, belief or religion, or political affiliation'." (p. 23) -- new emphasis on economical questions in terms of "free-market thinking" (p.24) supports Recent Hamas documents show a new emphasis on state building, "little inclination to radical posi- tions," and downplaying of religious "over- tones" (p. 25), "In fact, the religious references are relatively few: when combined they amount to about a page and a half out of the document’s fourteen pages, including the five Quranic verses" (p.12 f.). Regarding the six articles: "Except for the 'Religious Guidance and Preaching' section, the Islamic references are overshadowed by clauses that would be standard in any secular document" (p.13). "For its part, Hamas justifies its Islamic language and positions on the grounds that they reflect the true nature and aspirations of society" (15). objects -- First line of the preamble: "Compelled by our conviction that we are defending one of the greatest ports of Islam ..." (p.8) -- Section "Our principles": - those principles stem "from the Islamic tradition that we embrace" (p.9) - "True Islam ... is our frame of reference and our way of life." (p.9) -- In the "final appeal": "When you cast your ballot, remember your responsibility before God. ... Yes, make the right choice, that you may please God and your people, God willing. Islam is the solution, and it is our path for change and reform" (p.13) -- "Six other articles have at least one reference to Islam." [He lists all of them, p. 13 f.], all this might be "a ploy to gain power by concealing true agendas" (p.26) objects If recent documents show a new emphasis on state building, "little inclination to radical positions," and downplaying of religious "overtones," then there has been "an evolution in Hamas’s political thinking toward pragmatism and the Palestinian 'main- stream'." (p.25), If recent documents show a new emphasis on state building, "little inclination to radical positions," and downplaying of religious "overtones," then there has been "an evolution in Hamas’s political thinking toward pragmatism and the Palestinian 'main- stream'." (p.25) therefore There has been an "an evolution in Hamas’s political thinking toward pragmatism and the Palestinian 'mainstream'." (p.25), Recent Hamas documents show a new emphasis on state building, "little inclination to radical posi- tions," and downplaying of religious "over- tones" (p. 25) therefore There has been an "an evolution in Hamas’s political thinking toward pragmatism and the Palestinian 'mainstream'." (p.25)