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Hroub's critique of Herzog-2006_2, An analysis of analogies that "can be found in the modern history of the Muslim Middle East, with its assortment of relatively young independent states -- nations where there is no democratic tradition or culture and where the governments have been challenged by Islamist movements advocating for the imposition of sharia while brandishing swords": -- "In Turkey, the Islamists have been co-opted successfully," but based on "a secular public culture for more than eight decades and democratic institutions for more than five," and state and military "has set clear limits on political behavior." -- "Jordan presents a model of successful Islamist co-optation (although less so of democracy)," but this is based on political integration of Islamists over six decades and the fact that their political wing occupies only "an average of a third of the seats in parliament." -- In Egypt political integration of Islamist moderates was possible only after they separated from radicals, based on "repression and political exclusion." -- Lebanon's Hezbollah "maintains the most powerful militia in the country, with control of a virtually autonomous area in southern Lebanon and a global terrorist reach that has often served Iranian purposes. ... Joining the government did not prevent Hezbollah from undertaking a serious cross-border attack on Israel in late November 2005, nor has its ideological platform or political demeanor shown signs of moderation." supports a "comparative analysis suggests skepticism is in order about whether the conditions are ripe for Hamas to be co-opted by its political participation or if instead Hamas will simply use political participation as another vehicle for pursuing its alarming core objectives.", using historic "lessons" to justify an universal statement is an inductive inference. Induction, however, is not a valid argument form. Even if the conclusion might be highly probable, there is always the possibility that something new happens. leads to "the most important lesson" "co-optation through political participation is not a given, but rather depends on the existence of certain conditions in the local political context. No Islamist movement has renounced violence or moderated its ideology of its own volition; when one has done so at all, it has been for lack of a better alternative.", If you want an Islamic movement to renounce violence and to moderate its ideology, then you must develop pressure therefore "The Palestinians, with the help of Israel, the United States, and the rest of the international community, should now try hard to create the conditions under which Hamas may liberalize", "optimistic observers argue, however, that this concern is overblown. It is precisely the burdens and responsibilities that come with democratic politics, they claim, that will tame Hamas. After all, as the Carnegie Endowment's Marina Ottaway wrote last summer, 'There is ample evidence that participation in an electoral process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to moderate its position if it wants to attract voters in large numbers.' ... Instead of being concerned about Hamas' new role, the optimists contend, outsiders should actually welcome it as the most likely catalyst for moving the group's focus from radical rejectionism to mainstream politics." objects If a group is an Islamist movement that propagates violence, then granting this group legitimate political status and access to the prerogatives of state power means asking for trouble, why pressing if Hamas evolves already in the right direction? criticizes If you want an Islamic movement to renounce violence and to moderate its ideology, then you must develop pressure, "Outside actors should ... try to use their influence to create the proper incen- tives and disincentives for Hamas' future behavior," such as renouncing violence, disarming, and recognizing Israel's right to exist. by means of - giving or neglecting legitimacy - investing or not investing political and financial capital - removing or not removing Hamas from international terrorist lists, "There is ... overwhelming evidence pointing in the opposite direction. For example, Mahmoud al-Zahar, the group's leading figure, gave a series of interviews in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in which he explained that the group sees no connection between the elections and the Oslo process -- which is dead anyway -- and that any cease- fire along the 1967 borders would not come with a recognition of Israel or relations with it, but would be merely a step in the continued struggle. 'Some Israelis think that when we talk of the West Bank and Gaza it means we have given up our historic war,' Zahar told an Israeli newspaper in late October. 'This is not the case.' As for Hamas' stance on democracy, Zahar's words have been equally discouraging: he proclaimed, 'We will join the Legislative Council with our weapons in our hands,' later adding, 'In the Islamist Palestinian state, every citizen will be required to act in accordance with the codes of Islamic religious law' -- not exactly a Western vision of how democracy should function." but "Some observers detect signs that Hamas is already evolving in a moderate direction. They point to its very willingness to engage in elections and enter the Palestinian Legislative Council, an institution born from the Oslo peace process, which the group has long rejected; its acceptance of a temporary truce (tahdiya) with Israel; its expressed willingness to consider a longer cease-fire (hudna) should Israel withdraw to its 1967 borders; and various statements by Hamas leaders that exhibit flexibility.", "Palestinian political, security, and other institutions are a chaotic mess, and the pragmatic political center, represented by Fatah, is in complete disarray. Hamas is launching its political career in the legislative and executive branches without having disarmed and is quite possibly stronger than the rest of the state apparatus." supports "if one looks closely at the case of Hamas, hardly any of these potentially moderating factors are present.", Hamas is an Islamist movement that propagates violence therefore "Granting Hamas legitimate political status and access to the prerogatives of state power seems to be asking for trouble.", This focus is too narrow. It excludes all the information on Hamas that are within the boundaries of my (Hroub's) considerations. See: criticizes Hamas is an Islamist movement that propagates violence