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This Concept Map, created with IHMC CmapTools, has information related to: Nagel_2005_global-justice_map, justice includes "the elimination of morally arbitrary inequalities" (Rawls) therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens; Nagel 116) justice can only be realized if there is "some form of law, with centralized authority to determine the rules and a centralized monopoly of the power of enforcement", "Most modern conceptions of justice impose ... some condition of fairness or equality in the way the institutions of a just society treat its citizens, not only politically but economically and socially" (117-8) questions "the principles of justice" are "a set of rules and practices that would serve everyone’s interest if everyone conformed to them" (115), "some conditions of justice do not depend on associative obligations. The pro- tection, under sovereign power, of negative rights like bodily inviolability, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion is morally unmysterious. Those rights, if they exist, set universal and prepolitical limits to the legitimate use of power, independent of special forms of association" (126-7). implies we need to make a distinction, "one should favor a global difference principle [i.e., applying Rawls's second principle of justice globally]" (124-5) defeats (a cosmopolitan according to Nagel) "The duties governing the relations among peoples include, according to Rawls, not only nonaggression and fidelity to treaties, but also some developmental assistance to 'peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.' But they do not include any analogue of liberal socioeconomic justice." (124), Rawls beliefs that only intrasocietal inequalities are morally inacceptable therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens; 128b) for Rawls, arbitrary inequalities can only be "necessary but not suffi- cient to explain the pre- sumption against them", Rawls's theory of justice (122a) includes "his rejection of what Liam Murphy calls monism" (122), "The most basic rights and duties are universal, and not contingent on specific institutional relations between people. Only the heightened requirements of equal treatment embodied in principles of justice, including political equality, equality of opportunity, and distributive justice, are contingent in this way." (130a) clarifies there is no moral obligation to respond to the "gruesome facts of inequality in the world economy" (118a) beyond "some minimal concern we owe to fellow human beings threatened with starvation or severe mal- nutrition and early death from easily preventable diseases" (118a), Thomas Nagel (2005). The problem of global justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33(2), 113-147. visualized according to the rules and conventions of Logical Argument Mapping (LAM), as an example of "conceptions of justice that are based on much more other-regarding motives," rather than self-interest (116) comments justice includes "the elimination of morally arbitrary inequalities" (Rawls), "there are at least three morally significant connections between us and the global poor" which constitute a positive right to the amelioration of unfairness in the distribution of social and economic goods includes (Pogge, 313) "Third, they and we coexist within a single global economic order that has a strong tendency to perpetuate and even to aggrevate global economic inequality.", if the most basic human are universal, then "human rights generate a secondary obligation to do something, if we can, to protect people outside of our society against their most egregious violation" (132) therefore (ArgScheme: modus tollens) human rights generate a secondary obligation to protect people outside of our society against their most egregious violation, There are two concepts of justice that can be used "to respond to world inequality in general" (119a) includes cosmopolitanism (119), "our economic policies and the global economic institutions we impose make us causally and morally responsible for the perpetuation--even aggravation-- of world hunger" (313) Nagel supports this partly by "First, there are good reasons, not deriving from global socioeconomic justice, to be concerned about the consequences of economic relations with states that are internally egregiously unjust. Even if internal justice is the primary responsibility of each state, the complicity of other states in the active support or perpetuation of an unjust regime is a secondary offense against justice. Secondly, even self-interested bargaining between states should be tempered by considerations of humanity, and the best way of doing this in the present world is to allow poor societies to benefit from their comparative advantage in labor costs to become competitors in world markets. WTO negotiations have finally begun to show some sense that it is indecent, for example, when subsidies by wealthy nations to their own farmers cripple the market for agricultural products from developing countries, both for export and domestically." (143), "Some would argue that the present level of world economic interdependence already brings into force a version of the political conception of justice, so that Rawls’s principles, or some alternative principles of distributive justice, are appli- cable over the domain covered by the existing cooperative institutions" (137b) questions people outside of our own nation are not joined together with us "in a political society under strong centralized control" (127), "Political institutions create contingent, selective moral relations" (131a) supports if the state has an exceptional obligation to provide justice for its members, then the state's "obligations reach no farther than the demands do" (130), cosmopolitanism (119) can be justified by the cosmopolitan conception of justice "has considerable moral appeal" (126), the cosmopolitan conception of justice "has considerable moral appeal" (126) leads to as an example of "conceptions of justice that are based on much more other-regarding motives," rather than self-interest (116), if "it doesn’t take many defectors to make such a system [that pursues the elimination of morally arbitrary inequalities] unravel," then individuals, "however morally motivated, can only fall back on a pure aspiration for justice that has no practical expression" if there are no "enabling condition of sovereignty to confer stability on just institutions" therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens; Nagel 116) individuals, "however morally motivated, can only fall back on a pure aspiration for justice that has no practical expression" if there are no "enabling condition of sovereignty to confer stability on just institutions", if the state has an exceptional obligation to provide justice for its members, then the state's "obligations reach no farther than the demands do" (130) therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens) the state's "obligations reach no farther than the demands do" (130), Pogge, T. W. (2001). Priorities of global justice (Poverty, moral philosophy). Metaphilosophy, 32(1-2), 6-24. pagination here according to the abreviated version in Waller, B. N. (2007). Consider Ethics. Theory, Readings, and Contemporary Issues (2nd ed.). New York: Peasons-Longman, pp. 310-316