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This Concept Map, created with IHMC CmapTools, has information related to: Hume-on-the-impossibility-to-justify-empirical-knowledge, our belief concerning this matter of fact is founded on the assumption of a relation between cause (there were men on the island) and effect (there is still a watch on the island) therefore (ArgScheme modus ponens) all knowledge "concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relations of Cause and Effect" (26;32; 35 [226; 230; 232]), we explain our belief in the fact that a friend of ours is in France by a letter from our friend (26 [227]) therefore (ArgScheme modus ponens) our belief concerning this matter of fact is founded on the assumption of a relation between cause (the letter) and effect (our belief), so far, nobody has proven the existence of a particular power, "a medium, which may enable the mind to draw" the inference from past experiences to the future (34 [231]) leads to the burden of proof is on those who think that there is knowledge of causality and of matters of fact; they have to prove that such a medium "really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concer- ning matters of fact" (34 [231]), "If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support" (33 [230]) leads us to assume "we always presume, when we see like sen- sible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them (33 [230]), "nature ... has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she con- ceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends" (33 [230]) supports we perceive two events that we call cause and effect, but we do not perceive the causal relation between them, there is no knowledge of matters of fact means empirical knowledge is impossible, if we provide an argument "that the future will resemble the past" based on experience, then we pre- suppose for this argument what we want to prove: "that the future will resemble the past" therefore (ArgScheme modus tollens) we are not able to provide an argument based on experience, we cannot prove "that the future will resemble the past" (37 [233]) therefore (ArgScheme modus tollens) knowledge about causality can not be justified by ex- periencing that "similar objects or events to be con- stantly conjoined together" (42 [234]), it is not "reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their con- junction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other." (42 [233-4]) known as correlation is not causation, knowledge about the relation between cause and effect is either dis- coverable by reason or by experience therefore (ArgScheme disjunctive syllogism) knowledge about the relation between cause and effect is only dis- coverable by experience (27 [227]), we can prove "that the future will resemble the past" only if we are able to provide an a priori proof or by an argument based on experience therefore (ArgScheme modus tollens) we cannot prove "that the future will resemble the past" (37 [233]), knowledge about causality cannot be justified by experience therefore (ArgScheme modus ponens) it is impossible to justify knowl- edge of the relation between cause and effect, no a priori analysis of billiard balls could reveal that it can cause a certain trajectory of movements when they clash (29 [228-9]) supports if "every event is a distinct event from its cause," then "the mind can never pos- sibly find the effect in the supposed cause", all knowledge is either knowl- edge of relations of ideas or of matters of fact (25 [226]) therefore (ArgScheme modus ponens) knowledge about the relation between cause and effect is either dis- coverable by reason or by experience, our belief concerning this matter of fact is founded on the assumption of a relation between cause (the letter) and effect (our belief) therefore (ArgScheme modus ponens) all knowledge "concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relations of Cause and Effect" (26;32; 35 [226; 230; 232]), we cannot pre- suppose for this argument what we want to prove: "that the future will resemble the past" (36 [232]) therefore (ArgScheme modus tollens) we are not able to provide an argument based on experience, "the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses" (42 [233]) supports knowledge about causality can not be justified by ob- serving an effect in the cause (42 [233]), it is not "reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their con- junction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other." (42 [233-4]) supports knowledge about causality can not be justified by ob- serving that "one event in one instance precedes another" (42 [233]), knowledge about causality can not be justified by ob- serving that "one event in one instance precedes another" (42 [233]) therefore (ArgScheme modus tollens) knowledge about causality cannot be justified by experience, this experience can be explained as a habit of reasoning (as a "principle of human nature which is universally acknowled- ged"), but this is not suffi- cient as a justification (43 [234]) comments on "we always presume, when we see like sen- sible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them (33 [230])